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Despite the coherence and seeming directness of our bodily experience, our perception of
the world, including that of our own body, may constitute an inference based on ambigu-
ous sensory data and prior expectations. In this article, I apply a ‘psychologised’ version of
the recently proposed free energy framework to the understanding of certain disorders of
neurological unawareness in order to examine how inferential processes may determine
our body perception. I speciﬁcally consider three facets of body perception in such disor-
ders: namely, the ‘external body’ as inferred on the basis of exteroceptive signals and
related predictions; the ‘internal body’ as inferred on the basis of proprioceptive and inter-
oceptive signals and related predictions; and lastly the ‘impersonalised body’ as inferred on
the basis of signals from social and third-person perspectives on the body and related pre-
dictions. Several conclusions will be drawn from these considerations: (a) there is a deep
interdependency of prior beliefs and sensory data; as the brain uses sensory data to update
its virtual model of the world, lack or imprecision of sensory prediction errors may lead to
aberrant inferences inﬂuenced disproportionally by outdated, premorbid predictions; (b)
interoception and interoceptive salience have a unique role in our inferences about body
awareness and (c) social, ‘objectiﬁed’ prior beliefs about the body may have a silent but
potent role in our bodily self-awareness. Finally, the article emphasizes that our learned,
virtual model of the body is depended on the nature and thus integrity of the very body
that allowed the model to be formed in the ﬁrst place.
 2014 Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).1. Introduction: the ‘here and now’ as inference
Remembering the past, and being able to project oneself in the future, allows the mind to escape the psychological ‘here
and now’ of experience. Studies in psychology have long established that we do not only project our current self into the
future to build a kind of ‘as if’, imagined future self but we also reconstruct our past self in our memories (Bartlett,
1932). Despite the incredible storage capacity of human memory, what we remember in the now is not always what took
place in the past. Instead, the autobiographical incidents that we experience as veridical, coherent and self-deﬁning are fre-
quently unconscious collages of previous recollective attempts, fragments of experienced events, currents thoughts and long
term goals (Conway, 2005). In this sense, we have come to understand our autobiographical self as actively, yet uncon-
sciously inferred on the basis of imperfect memory data and current expectations.College
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has also being long proposed in psychology (e.g. Gregory, 1966). Despite the coherence and seeming directness of our expe-
rience, our perception of the world may constitute an inference based on ambiguous sensory data and prior expectations
(von Helmholtz, 1878/1971). However, this idea is less established, perhaps given its counterintuitive nature and complex,
philosophical implications. We experience the world via our body and the experience of the latter in the ‘here and now’ is
considered as a fundamental aspect of our self-consciousness; our bodily self is the foundation upon which our ‘autobio-
graphical’, ‘narrative’ or ‘extended’ self is built (Gallagher, 2000). If our bodily self is an inference, then our ability to perceive
the world and ourselves veridically is called into challenge (see Clark, 2013 for discussion). Leaving aside the majority of the
long and complicated philosophical discussions on the nature of reality and our capacity to perceive it, in this paper I will
explore similar ideas from the point of view of a recent, inﬂuential theory from computational neuroscience. The theory aims
to deﬁne the idea of perceptual inference using concepts from theoretical physics and mathematics and also aims to ground
the same idea on biology and particularly knowledge about the workings of the brain. In the current paper, I will not address
the issues of interest in mathematical ways. Instead, I will use a ‘psychologised’ version of the free energy framework in
order to examine some ideas regarding neurological unawareness and ultimately bodily self-consciousness. Speciﬁcally, I
will use clinical observations, behavioural and neural data from a speciﬁc neurological aberration of self-awareness, namely
anosognosia for hemiplegia, to explore the possibility that our bodily self-awareness is normally imperfect, in the sense that
it is based on a set of inferences about the hidden causes of sensorimotor signals. I also hope to demonstrate that the study of
the pathologically exaggerated ways in which we may infer the experience of our own body, can provide insights into the
mechanisms of normal perceptual and active inference, and particularly the predictive and social nature of motor awareness.
2. The free energy framework
The starting point of the ‘free energy framework’ (Friston, 2005) is that humans are biological, self-organising agents that
need to occupy a limited repertoire of sensory states for homeostatic reasons (e.g. humans need certain ranges in environ-
mental temperature in order to survive). However, due to the inherent ambiguity and uncertainty of the signals an organism
receives from the world, we risk ﬁnding ourselves in dangerous states for longer periods than those we could biologically
sustain (e.g. in cold climates). We thus need to be able to predict (infer) the causes of our possible sensory states despite
the limited or noisy information available to our sensory organs (von Helmholtz, 1878/1971). The framework proposes that
our brain engages in a form of probabilistic representation of the causes (e.g. the weather) of our future states (e.g. our tem-
perature) on the basis of noisy sensory data; in other terms, it maintains hypotheses (‘‘generative models’’) of the hidden
causes of sensory input. Furthermore, it uses such input to constantly update its models, so as to reduce its representational
errors over time and thus ultimately minimize the risk of surprise (unpredictability, see below for mathematical deﬁnition).
From a psychological point of view, I will refer to the formation of such models as the ‘mentalisation’ of sensorimotor signals.
Although the term mentalisation is traditionally used in psychology to refer to our cognitive ability to infer the mental states
of others and our own, I think the two terms are related (see also Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007). In fact, the use of the term
‘mentalisation’ in this article is intending to ground this traditional concept in its embodied origin.
Returning to the biological level, the free energy framework is biologically constrained by the so-called ‘predictive coding’
models of perception, stemming primarily from biological and behavioural studies in visual perception, with supporting evi-
dence generated in variousmodalities (e.g. Henson & Gagnepain, 2010;McNally, Johansen, & Blair, 2011). These suggest that a
constant ﬁltering of sensations by top-downpredictions and a parallel updating of the latter based on prediction errors (signals
representing the mismatch between predictions and sensations), with the ultimate goal of minimizing prediction errors, is an
imperfect but highly efﬁcient means of perceiving sensations (Rao & Ballard, 1999). Our brain is assumed to achieve the min-
imisation of prediction errors by recurrentmessage passing among hierarchical level of cortical systems, so that various neural
subsystems at different hierarchical levels minimize uncertainty about incoming information by generating a prediction (or a
prior belief, see below) and responding to errors (mismatches) in the accuracy of the prediction, or prediction errors. Such pre-
diction errors are passed forward to drive the units in the level above that encode conditional expectationswhich optimize top-
down predictions to explain away (reduce, inhibit) prediction error in the level below until conditional expectations are opti-
mized. Suchmessage passing is considered neurobiologically plausible on the basis of functional asymmetries in cortical hier-
archies; prediction errors are thought to be conveyed via feedforward connections from lower to higher levels in order to
optimize representations in the latter. Predictions from higher-levels are transferred via feedback connections that have both
driving andmodulatory characteristics and can suppress prediction errors in lower levels. This hierarchy is thus reciprocal but
asymmetric and models the nonlinear generation of sensory input (Adams, Shipp, & Friston, 2013).
Based on such hierarchical, perceptual schemes, the free energy principle, rests upon the idea that the brain as a whole
works as an Helmholtzian inference machine that is trying to optimize its own model of the world by actively predicting the
causes of its sensory inputs (Friston, 2005). Moreover, this inferential process is mathematically understood in Bayesian
terms (Bayes’ theorem describes an optimal procedure for updating the probabilities assigned to a hypothesis in the light
of new evidence), in the sense that it relies on a combination of prior beliefs (probability distributions over some unknown
cause excluding any sensory data) and new sensory data to update prior beliefs and generate posterior beliefs (probability
distributions over some unknown cause after data have been received). Furthermore, in the free energy principle this hier-
archical minimization of prediction errors is understood as a minimization of free-energy on the basis of the formal deﬁni-
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& von Camp, 1993). In this case the data is sensory and free energy bounds the negative log-evidence (surprise) inherent in
sensory data, under a model of how the data were caused (See Friston, 2010 for the mathematical details). Given somemath-
ematical assumptions, free energy can be thought of as the amount of prediction error in any given level of the system. Min-
imizing free energy then corresponds to explaining away prediction errors following the principles of Bayes (Friston, 2010).
However, representing the world in constructive ways (perceptual inference) cannot take us far in terms of our ultimate
goal; surviving in an uncertain world. Psychologically speaking, we may become better in predicting (‘mentalising’) the
changes in the environment that act to produce sensory impressions on us, but we cannot on this basis change the sensations
themselves and hence ultimately their surprise. A highly innovative conceptual move in the free energy principle framework
allows us to understand howwe do just that. By acting upon the world we can change its states and therefore ‘re-sample’ the
world to ensure we satisfy our predictions about the sensory input we expect to receive. By selectively sampling the sensory
inputs that we expect we add accuracy to our predictions about sensory states. Thus, action has an intimate relationship with
perception, both being governed by the same master principle, namely reduction of free energy; action can reduce free
energy by changing sensory input, while perception reduces free-energy by changing predictions.
In sum, the framework is consistent with theories of embodied cognition and enactive perception (see Clark, 2013 for dis-
cussion) that stress the role of embodiment in shaping cognition and propose a close link between action and perception. The
framework further makes strong claims about cognition consisting of predictions (or priors) that do not represent the world
and our bodily state directly. Instead, in order to evade the inherent surprise of the world, our cognition serves a constantly-
updated, Bayes-optimal, iterative, self-fulﬁlling prophecy. via a cascade of multilevel processing across the neurocognitive
hierarchy, we progressively minimise our own representational errors in perception and maximize the posterior probability
of generating the observed sensory states in action. In doing so, we generate a kind of ‘virtual version’ of the sources of our
bodily signals. The state of the body and its world is, in this sense, never directly available to perception and always inferred.
At this point however, an important clariﬁcation needs to be made. The framework does not imply that the mind is (dual-
istically) divorced from its environment, including its body. The generative models in question are not viewed as mere func-
tions somehow ‘housed’ in the brain, and ‘informed’ about the body by sensory states. Instead, the ‘mentalisation’ of the body
implies physical, changes in the structure and function of the body itself, from the periphery to the brain. Indeed, the frame-
work suggests that the structure and physiology of the brain itself are shaped by sensory states in as much as they shape
them (in both ontogenetic and phylogenetic development) (e.g. see Adams et al., 2013). In other terms, the inferential, pre-
dictive models of possible causes of sensory input are understood as embodied (e.g. reﬂecting changes in synaptic connec-
tivity) at different levels of the neurobiological hierarchy. It follows that in its totality, the self-organised, agentive virtual
model in question is not merely ‘corrected’ by our embodiment (i.e. affected by sensory prediction errors), but rather it is
our embodiment. In this sense, perception of the body and the world is both truly indirect (virtual, predictive) in the ‘here
and now’ and exact in the long-term: it can ultimately only represent itself.
3. Anosognosia for hemiplegia
Anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP) is deﬁned as the apparent unawareness of one’s paralysis (Babinski, 1914), which
occurs typically following stroke-induced right perisylvian lesions, and less often following left perisylvian lesions
(Cocchini, Beschin, Cameron, Fotopoulou, & Della Sala, 2009). This prototypical, neurological disorder of body unawareness
affects our awareness of action; a composite notion that includes at least two facets, the subjective feeling of moving in the
here-and-now, and more general beliefs or judgments about one’s motor abilities, such as being able to perform certain bilat-
eral actions (see also below for the related distinction of on-line versus off-line awareness, as well as the distinction between
illusory versus delusional awareness). In a subset of patients with concomitant body delusions (somatoparaphrenias,
Gerstmann, 1942), the right-hemisphere damage can also affects the sense of body ownership (the subjective feeling that
our body is separate from the world and other bodies). Such patients may reject the ownership of one’s limb (asomatogn-
osia), misattribute it to others, or vice versa (somatoparaphrenia proper), claim they have three or more limbs (supernumer-
ary limbs), or treat the limb as though it was a separate person (personiﬁcation; Critchley, 1955).
The typical duration of AHP ranges from days to weeks (Vocat, Staub, Stroppini, & Vuilleumier, 2010), but in about one
third of patients the symptoms may last beyond the acute stage of illness and even years (see Pia, Neppi-Modona, Ricci, &
Berti, 2004). AHP can be highly speciﬁc in that some patients deny their plegia, while being simultaneously aware of other
neurological, or neuropsychological disturbances (Bisiach, Vallar, Perani, Papagno, & Berti, 1986; Berti, Làdavas, & Della
Corte, 1996; Marcel, Tegner, & Nimmo-Smith, 2004). In terms of AHP’s ‘extension’ (what kinds, or objects of awareness
can be compromised, Marcel et al., 2004), some patients acknowledge their motor deﬁcits but fail to adjust to their func-
tional consequences, while others show the opposite pattern (Marcel et al., 2004; Moro, Pernigo, Zapparoli, Cordioli, &
Aglioti, 2011). Furthermore, some patients claim their limbs have moved even upon demonstration of the opposite (illusory
movements, Feinberg, Roane, & Ali, 2000; Fotopoulou, Tsakiris, Haggard, Rudd, & Kopelman, 2008), while others admit their
on-line failure, but fail to update their long-term or, ‘off-line’ body awareness (Carruthers, 2008; Marcel et al., 2004; Moro
et al., 2011; Tsakiris & Fotopoulou, 2008). A related, and at times hard to separate, characteristic of AHP is its ‘partiality’
(whether unawareness of one’s deﬁcit is less than total, Marcel et al., 2004). This property is noted in studies that demon-
strate implicit awareness of deﬁcits despite explicit unawareness in verbal (Fotopoulou, Pernigo, Maeda, Rudd, & Kopelman,
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& Turnbull, 2007), as well as in studies that show higher awareness of plegia in third-person versus ﬁrst person tasks. For
example, patients have been observed to deny their deﬁcits in direct view but admit them in a video replay (Besharati,
Kopelman, Avesani, Moro, & Fotopoulou, 2014; Fotopoulou, Rudd, Holmes, & Kopelman, 2009) or in 3rd-person questions
(Fotopoulou et al., 2011; Marcel et al., 2004). Similarly, patients who deny the ownership of their arms (see above) in direct
view have been shown to admit them in front of a mirror (Fotopoulou et al., 2011; Jenkinson, Haggard, Ferreira, &
Fotopoulou, 2013), and even show improved somatosensation when tested from a 3rd-person perspective (Bottini,
Bisiach, Sterzi, & Vallar, 2002), or when they use their ipsilesional hand to actively touch their affected, contralesional
arm (Van Stralen, van Zandvoort, & Dijkerman, 2011). More recently, we also showed that anosognosia can be momentarily
reduced following affective, social feedback (Besharati et al., 2014).
Despite recent rapid progress in the assessment and understanding of AHP (see Fotopoulou, 2014; Jenkinson, Preston, &
Ellis, 2011; Orfei, Caltagirone, & Spalletta, 2009 for reviews), little consensus exists regarding its functional and neuroana-
tomical explanation. Older theories emphasise deﬁcits in afferent (feedback) and bottom-up signals, while more recent
hypotheses focus on modular abnormalities in predictive (feedforward) signals and their role in motor awareness (Berti
et al., 2005; Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000; Heilman, Barret, & Adair, 1998; see also Jenkinson & Fotopoulou, 2010 for
review). For example, on the basis of a computational model of motor control (Wolpert, 1997), Frith et al. (2000) have pro-
posed that although patients with AHP are able to predict the expected sensory consequences of intended movements, they
fail to register the discrepancy between predicted and actual sensory feedback because of visuospatial neglect or other sen-
sory deﬁcits. Berti and colleagues (see Berti et al., 2007 for review) suggested that this failure may instead relate directly to
damage to the lateral premotor cortex (Berti et al., 2005). This group as well as other groups have further produced physi-
ological (Berti et al., 2007; Hildebrandt & Zieger, 1995; but see Gold, Adair, Jacobs, & Heilman, 1994) and behavioural
(Garbarini et al., 2012; Jenkinson, Edelstyn, & Ellis, 2009) evidence showing that there are intact motor intentions in AHP.
A further study showed for the ﬁrst time the direct relation between motor intention and awareness (Fotopoulou et al.,
2008). The authors were able to show that patients’ illusory awareness of movement reﬂected an abnormal, selective dom-
inance of motor intentions over visual feedback about the actual effects of movement (elicited by a realistic rubber-hand
patients assumed was their own), and this effect could not be explained by neglect. Lastly, while as mentioned above, taking
a third-person perspective on the self, verbally (e.g. Marcel et al., 2004) or visually by video-replays (Besharati, Kopelman,
et al., 2014; Fotopoulou et al., 2009) may improve awareness, there may also be an alternative, motor explanation of the
video-replay results. During video viewing, patients receive visual feedback of their paralysis at a time when they are not
intending to move and hence forward signals are rendered irrelevant to motor awareness. Patients’ awareness during
video-replay needs to rely exclusively on the visual or auditory feedback they receive via the video clip.
Despite the clear value of the ‘feedforward’ hypotheses, it has become apparent to many authors that a strictly modular,
motor explanation is not sufﬁcient to account for all the manifestations of AHP. For example, such theories cannot explain
why mood induction can temporarily improve AHP (Besharati, Forkel, et al., 2014), nor account for the extension and par-
tiality of AHP (see above). Indeed, recent experimental studies have shown that awareness dissociations between and within
patients are linked with different lesion patterns, including limbic areas non-associated with motor functions (Fotopoulou
et al., 2010; Moro et al., 2011). Similarly, in a voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping study, Vocat et al. (2010) demonstrated
that the neuropsychological and neural proﬁle of AHP patients’ changes in time, and different lesion patterns are associated
with AHP at different time points. These studies point to a multi-component disorder occurring due to lesions affecting a
distributed set of brain regions, including the insula, premotor and parietal regions but also subcortical areas such as the
thalamus, basal ganglia and limbic structures.
More broadly, a number of authors have noted that AHP sometimes has delusional features that cannot be explained
solely on the basis of sensorimotor deﬁcits (for discussion, see Fotopoulou, 2010; Frith et al., 2000; Ramachandran, 1995;
Turnbull & Solms, 2007; Vuilleumier, 2004; Turnbull, Fotopoulou, & Solms, 2014). Feedforward theories are valuable in
explaining the illusion of moving (Fotopoulou et al., 2008), but AHP patients do not simply claim that they have the phenom-
enal experience of moving. In fact, typically patients with AHP do not spontaneously complain of any related, subjectively
perceived symptom, whether negative (e.g. I am not moving) or positive (I have the impression that I am moving). On
the contrary, AHP is diagnosed on the basis of questioning during which patients are typically asked to report on their cur-
rent experiences (confrontation questions) and infer their more general motor abilities (see also Marcel et al., 2004). Even
patients who report illusory experiences of movement during confrontation and hence presumably base their inferences
on such impressions (Fotopoulou et al., 2008), they nevertheless simultaneously ignore the wealth of contrary evidence
and medical signs indicating that they are paralysed (e.g. their medical results, disabilities, occasional accidents and others’
feedback). This perceptual ‘selectivity’ is not the same as the one observed in other symptoms such as hemispatial or per-
sonal neglect, in the sense that patients with neglect can become aware of the fact that they have neglect after their errors
are demonstrated to them. They then continue to do such errors but they are not surprised or in denial when these errors are
pointed out to them again. In fact, the subset of patients who cannot become aware of their neglect would be diagnosed as
anosognosic for these deﬁcits. Moreover, as aforementioned, there is now also experimental evidence that patients with AHP
maintain their denial even after they themselves had admitted their paralysis momentarily (e.g. Besharati, Forkel, et al.,
2014). It can thus be said that they adhere to the delusional belief that they have functional limbs.
If one accepts that anosognosia has delusional features then theoretical loans from the literature on delusions can be
allowed (see Fletcher & Fotopoulou, 2014; Fotopoulou, 2010 for discussions). Of particular interest here is the ongoing
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sual experience should be sufﬁcient to ultimately lead to refractory, delusion beliefs (e.g. Maher, 1992). By contrast, two-fac-
tor theories claim that delusional beliefs cannot be explained without the role of additional, cognitive dysfunctions such as
reasoning biases, or monitoring deﬁcits that are necessary for the generation and maintenance of the false beliefs (e.g.
Davies, Coltheart, Langdon, & Breen, 2001; Garety & Freeman, 1999).
Indeed, also in the literature on anosognosia, a third set of recent theories emphasise that the explanation of anosognosic
beliefs and attitudes requires the postulation of additional dysfunctions that prevents sensorimotor and other failures to be
re-represented at a higher level of cognitive and emotional self-representation, beyond the sensorimotor domain. These
accounts stress the necessary combination of bottom-up and top-down deﬁcits and corresponding lesioned brain regions
(Davies, Davies, & Coltheart 2005; Levine, 1990; Levine, Calvanio, & Rinn, 1991; Vuilleumier, 2004). For example, considering
anosognosia in the more general context of delusional beliefs, Davies et al. (2005) proposed that anosognosic beliefs maybe
explained by a two-factor account used to explain other delusions; abnormal beliefs arise due to a ﬁrst impairment in per-
ception that prompts the abnormal belief and a second impairment that interferes with higher-order, monitoring processes
thus allowing the abnormal perceptions to become abnormal beliefs.
These accounts have undoubtedly being useful in emphasizing the multifaceted nature of AHP, and for attempting to link
the understanding of anosognosic phenomena with insights about the cognitive processes that may underlie normal and
pathological belief formation (see also Fotopoulou, 2010, 2012). However, these accounts have been criticized for not being
falsiﬁable (Vallar & Ronchi, 2006). Moreover, reﬂecting the modular epistemology of cognitive neuropsychology (Fotopoulou,
2014 for a critical review), these models treat the described deﬁcits as simply ‘additive’ and as potentially caused by simul-
taneous damage to functionally independent lesion sites. For example, Vocat et al. (2010) suggested that a combination of
lesions to two or more brain areas within the insular, premotor, parietal and temporal cortex, or the white matter connec-
tions that link one or more of these areas with subcortical regions, may lead to different combinations of deﬁcits in functions
such as proprioception, spatial neglect, and error monitoring, which in turn lead to anosognosia in different patients. While
such ‘combinations’ of lesion sites and deﬁcits are consistent with the multifaceted nature of AHP, what these accounts lack
is a more precise neurobiological and neuropsychological description of the dynamic and hierarchical relation between the
affected areas and their integrated functional role in body awareness.
At this point, we turn to the aforementioned free energy framework in order to propose an alternative model of AHP that
aims to address precisely this limitation, as well as to describe the unique, virtual nature of perception and the social nature
of the bodily self. Finally, this model effectively uniﬁes previous one- and two-factor models of anosognosia, as it does not
allow for a distinction between perception (experience) and cognition (inference) at any level. Instead, as explained above,
all perception (including all conscious experiences) is always an inference. Thus, according to the model, the difference
between the various manifestations and possible subtypes of anosognosia cannot be captured on the basis of this distinction
between perception and cognition. Instead, one explanatory factor is indeed sufﬁcient to explain all manifestations of ano-
sognosia, but this factor is not anomalous experience. Rather it is the aforementioned, always embodied and always cogni-
tive form of inference that may become aberrant in anosognosia, as in other delusions (Corlett, Taylor, Wang, Fletcher, &
Krystal, 2009). We consider the particular kind of aberration that may lead to AHP in the following section.
4. Abnormal inferences about the body
On the basis of the free-energy principle, this paper puts forward the idea that AHP can be best explained as aberrant
perceptual inference at various levels of the neurocognitive hierarchy. It is speciﬁcally proposed that the observed lesions
result in weak, absent or unreliable prediction errors about sensorimotor states of the affected body parts, which ultimately
lead patients to base their inference on premorbid, non-updated predictions about their motor abilities and their agency in
the world. This faulty relationship between premorbid, habitual predictions and imperfect processing of current prediction
errors is thought to take place at different levels of the neurocognitive hierarchy, consistently with the varied phenomenol-
ogy and critical lesion sites of patients with AHP (e.g. Fotopoulou et al., 2010; Vocat et al., 2010). We consider some of the
critical types of such Bayes-optimal, yet aberrant, inference in further detail below.
4.1. Anosognosia for hemiplegia and the ‘External Body’
AHP typically occurs in the context of a number of concomitant sensory impairments, including primary exteroceptive
(signals relating to the state of world and the external surface of the body) deﬁcits as well as related, higher order impair-
ments such as visuospatial or, personal neglect (see Vallar & Ronchi, 2006; Small & Ellis, 1996 for reviews). During the 1980s
and 1990s, studies under the epistemological remit of cognitive neuropsychology, attempted to establish whether any of
these deﬁcits or any given combination of deﬁcits could explain the occurrence of one or more of the above anosognosic phe-
nomena (see Fotopoulou, 2014 for review). These studies revealed double dissociations between AHP and such impairments,
suggesting that none was necessary for AHP to occur (e.g. Bisiach et al., 1986; Marcel et al., 2004).
Nevertheless, under the remit of the free energy principle, these dissociations do not exclude the possibility that some of
these deﬁcits may act as predisposing, or contributing factors. Exteroceptive signals about the left side of the body, as rep-
resented in the connections of right hemisphere subcortical areas (e.g. the thalamus), or re-represented and organised in cor-
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2010) may be weak, or even absent due to damage to one or more of these areas. Such damage may therefore allow predic-
tive signals at these levels to continue to operate ‘unchecked’ by appropriate prediction errors about the current, exterocep-
tive state of the body. In other terms, there will not be sufﬁcient or sufﬁciently precise (see also below) signals to update
one’s normally, predictive motor awareness. It is further expected that the more and the greater the deﬁcits in one or more
of these domains, the greater the likelihood of faulty (anosognosic) inferences. Indeed, a recent paper revealed a positive cor-
relation between the degree of AHP and the combined quantity of such deﬁcits (Vocat et al., 2010).
However, as aforementioned, it is unlikely that these deﬁcits are sufﬁcient to explain the richness of anosognosic phe-
nomena and are best equipped to explain the illusion of moving, rather than the more general delusional beliefs and atti-
tudes s that patients with AHP show in several cognitive and emotional domains. If such deﬁcits were the sole cause of
AHP, it would be unclear why other, unaffected bottom-up information about the body (e.g. internal, homeostatic signals,
see below) could not provide the necessary prediction errors to update one’s beliefs about the current state of the body.
It would also be unclear why other top-down predictions about the body (e.g. the prediction that one will not fall after mov-
ing one’s left leg) were not used to update beliefs about the body.
4.2. Anosognosia for hemiplegia and the ‘Internal Body’
A further set of important signals about the body arises from within the body’s skin boundary. These include propriocep-
tive and more generally kinesthetic sensations about the position and dynamic properties of the body in space arising from
the vestibular system and from muscles and tendons, as well as interoceptive sensations about the physiological conditions
of all internal organs (Craig, 2009).
Deﬁcits in prioprioception are not sufﬁcient to cause AHP but they have been shown to be among the most common def-
icits in AHP patients (Vallar & Ronchi, 2006; Vocat et al., 2010). The vestibular system is also thought to be affected in AHP,
given the fact that vestibular stimulation has been shown to temporarily reinstate awareness (Cappa, Sterzi, Vallar, & Bisiach,
1987; Ramachandran, 1995; Ronchi et al., 2013). Such deﬁcits are potentially important when trying to understand motor
awareness, as according to the free energy framework, predictive signals during action do not constitute forward signals on
the basis of efference copies of motor commands but rather sensorimotor predictions (e.g. proprioceptive predictions) about
the effects of movement (for detailed discussions, see Adams et al., 2013; Friston, 2010). This perspective thus implies that
some patients may have reduced ability to generate novel predictions about their bodily and spatial effects of their potential
left-sided movements (see also Heilman et al., 1998 for a similar proposal based on a previous computational model of motor
control and awareness). Although this deﬁcit may contribute to unawareness in some patients, previous studies have shown
that at least some patients with AHP have intact ability to generate sensorimotor predictions (see above). Moreover, if
patients with AHP are unable to generate such predictions, the fact that some patients insist that they have moved as desired,
i.e. fulﬁlled kinesthetic predictions, is not easy to explain.
Importantly, even in patients whose proprioceptive and vestibular systems are intact, there is a degree of paresis due to
damage to the motor system. In fact prototypical cases of motor unawareness are considered the ones who show complete
paralysis of their left limbs. Thus, an important source of disruption may be the mere fact that patient can no longer fulﬁll
their proprioceptive and other related priors by active sampling of prediction errors (i.e. transmitting such descending somato-
motor predictions to the peripheral motor system and moving their affected limbs so as to generate reafference). AHP
patients should be able to generate such somatomotor predictions in spared premotor and parietal cortex areas (Berti
et al., 2005; Karnath, Baier, & Nägele, 2005). However, damage further down the hierarchy would mean that such predictions
are not fulﬁlled by the motor system. Nevertheless, unlike the aforementioned effects of missing or weak prediction errors
that are passed up the cortical hierarchy in order to modify perceptual inference, such disruptions in active inference at the
spinal cord or subcortical level should not have an effect of motor awareness. The normal role of such somatomotor (mainly
proprioceptive) reafference seems to be to modify descending predictions at spinothalamic and spino-cerebellothalamic cir-
cuits, thus allowing, fast, ‘automatic’ correction and control of movement. Indeed, this lack of active inference does not seem
sufﬁcient to cause AHP as the syndrome occurs in a minority of patients with stroke-induced hemiplegia.
It thus seems that while exteroceptive, proprioceptive and motor deﬁcits may be important contributors to the symptom-
atology of some patients with AHP, they are unlikely to be its primary or central causes. By contrast, another facet of the
internal body may have a more central role in AHP. Recent lesion mapping studies have highlighted that areas such as
the insula, limbic structures and subcortical white matter connections may be selectively associated with AHP
(Fotopoulou et al., 2010; Karnath et al., 2005; Moro et al., 2011; Vocat et al., 2010). Such areas and their connections are
linked with interoception and motivation and are speciﬁcally implicated in bodily salience and interoceptive awareness
(Craig, 2009; Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, Öhman, & Dolan, 2004). Thus, we propose that weak or imprecise (see also below)
interoceptive and emotional signals about the current (physiological) state of the body, may lead to difﬁculties in affectively
personalising new sensorimotor information about the affected body parts. This would be coupled with a persistent, neces-
sary adherence to past expectations of how the affected body parts should feel, ultimately leading to the aberrant beliefs
about any available contrary information about the body. In support of this hypothesis, a recent study (Romano, Gandola,
Bottini, & Maravita, 2014) shown that right hemisphere patients who show somatoparaphrenic beliefs about their affected
body parts, also show reduced physiological reactions to the threat of the same body parts, as measured by skin conductance
responses.
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ence may also ‘explain away’ contrary exteroceptive signals during instances of multisensory integration. To use the words
of one anosognosic patient who also denied the ownership of his paralysed limbs ‘‘But my eyes and my feelings don’t agree,
and I must believe my feelings. I know they [left arm and leg] look like mine, but I can feel they are not, and I can’t believe my
eyes.’’ (C.W. Olsen, 1937, cited in Feinberg, 1997). The degree to which such interoceptive deﬁcits are linked to delusions of
ownership more frequently than delusions of motor awareness remains to be speciﬁed in future studies.
Furthermore, a related deﬁcit in the processing of salience from the affected body parts needs to be emphasized. As afore-
mentioned, activity in areas such as the insular and the limbic cortex is not only linked with interoception and emotion but
more generally with interoceptive salience and motivation. In the free energy framework, these notions are linked to the
concepts of ‘precision’ (mathematically inverse dispersion or variance, and hence the inverse of uncertainty) and its neuro-
chemical equivalent, neuromodulation (Friston et al., 2012). Speciﬁcally, precision is linked mainly with the neuromodula-
tion of synaptic gain that encodes the uncertainty of random ﬂuctuations about predicted states. It follows that
neuromodulators of synaptic gain (such as dopamine and acetylcholine), do not signal (reward or pleasure) prediction errors
about sensory data but the context in which such data were encountered. In other words, such neuromodulators report the
salience of sensorimotor representations encoded by the activity of the synapses they modulate. This is important, especially
in hierarchical schemes, where precision controls the relative inﬂuence of bottom-up prediction errors and top-down pre-
dictions. In psychological terms, the processing of salience expectancy allows the organism to control the signiﬁcance it attri-
butes to the sensory data it uses to update its predictions or to explain away prediction errors.
The above considerations have added potency in AHP given the above critical lesion cites, as well the recently identiﬁed
lesions in fronto-striatal circuits (Fotopoulou et al., 2010; Moro et al., 2011; Venneri & Shanks, 2004; Vocat et al., 2010). Such
lesions may lead to a more general difﬁculty in optimizing the precision of prediction errors (Friston et al., 2012), affecting
their salience and ultimately both short- and long-term learning (suboptimal synaptic gain and plasticity, Friston, 2010).
Indeed, the functional role of the basal ganglia and particularly the striatum has been linked with prediction error-driven
learning (O’Doherty et al., 2003) as well as the aberrant salience theories of psychosis (Gray, Feldon, Rawlins, Hemsley, &
Smith, 1991; Kapur, 2003). In AHP such deﬁcits can be linked with both speciﬁc instances of aberrant motor monitoring
in functionally specialised systems (Berti et al., 2005), or more generally in global error monitoring (Davies et al., 2005;
Venneri & Shanks, 2004; Vocat, Saj, & Vuilleumier, 2012), mental ﬂexibility (Levine et al., 1991) and ‘surprise detection’
(Ramachandran, 1995) deﬁcits.
Indeed, a recent study showed that AHP patients had the tendency to ‘jump to conclusions’ on the basis of limited and
rather vague information and then to subsequently get stuck to their former ‘‘false’’ beliefs instead of modifying them based
on novel, arguably more salient information (Vocat et al., 2012). Another study (Besharati, Forkel, et al., 2014) further found
that anosognosia can be temporarily reduced by the induction of negative mood, presumably because negative emotions
prime the organism for defensive action and increase the salience of sensorimotor signals (see Pereira et al., 2010;
Gentsch, & Synofzik, 2014). These ‘neuromodulatory’ deﬁcits may explain some of the delusional features of AHP that are
harder to explain on the basis of deﬁcits in sensorimotor signals per se, be those exteroceptive or interoceptive. For example,
they provide some insight into how patients can remain in denial of their paralysis and/or apathetic towards the normally
alarming sight of a paralysed left arm and its related consequences.
More generally, this explanation of anosognosia as an inability to update body awareness in a way that takes into account
and ‘personalises’ new motor (agentive), interoceptive (emotional) or, just salient information about the affected body parts
has the advantage of unifying the hypotheses put forward previously by modular (e.g. Berti et al., 2005; Karnath et al., 2005)
and multi-factorial theories (e.g. Davies et al., 2005; Vuilleumier, 2004) on a single, uniﬁed and neurobiologically-plausible
formulation. Moreover, this formulation integrates both bottom-up and top-down mechanisms of bodily perception, action
and belief formation (see also Fotopoulou, 2012; Fotopoulou, 2014). Furthermore taken together, the above considerations
on AHP in the light of the free energy framework highlight, not only how our awareness of our own body is based on habitual
predictions of its state in the world, but also how this learned, virtual model of the body is depended on the integrity of the
very body that allowed the model to be formed in the ﬁrst place (see introduction). I now turn to a ﬁnal aspect of body
awareness formation that seems less intuitive than the rest and can hopefully be made more evident via the study of AHP.
4.3. Anosognosia for hemiplegia and the ‘Impersonalised Body’
As explained above, the proposal regarding the inability to shape unconscious inferences about the body by prediction
errors signaling information about the affected body parts as ‘personal’ and relevant to the self can explain a lot of anosog-
nosic features and beliefs. However, a fundamental question remains. Patients seem unable to use other higher-order knowl-
edge, including social feedback, to update their beliefs. This failure is not easy to explain on the basis of any sensorimotor
deﬁcits. Of course, their feelings that the paralysed body parts are of limited self-relevance partly explains why they would
disregard social feedback for some time. As the aforementioned patient claimed, one has learned to trust one’s feelings about
the body over and above other sources of information. This is also consistent with the assumed hierarchy of the proposed
model; brain areas assumed to subserve interoception and emotion are thought of as higher in the neurocognitive hierarchy
than areas subserving exteroception (Friston, 2013). However, why are aberrant interoceptive inferences not updated by pri-
ors at even higher levels? For example, the model includes the possibility of other, already formed generative models about
the self with predictions represented at higher levels (e.g. ‘my family and doctors would not lie to me about serious health
A. Fotopoulou / Consciousness and Cognition 33 (2015) 500–510 507issues’) that could presumably be used to send predictions down the neurocognitive hierarchy and eventually inﬂuence the
inferences based on faulty interoception and salience. Given that patients’ beliefs about their motor abilities seem uninﬂu-
enced by such knowledge we infer that these processes are not taking place. This assumption is consistent with the afore-
mentioned clinical observation that patients with AHP frequently refer to other people’s opinions on their bodily state,
without altering their self-awareness. For example, they say phrases like ‘I know the doctors think I am paralysed, but I
do not believe it’, ‘everyone says I cannot move, but I know I can’. If such third-person knowledge about the self is available
why is it not affecting their own opinion about themselves?
The answer could be that this particular aspect of perception-cognition, particularly as applied to the affected body parts,
is also damaged by the right hemisphere damage in question. In this section, I will try to describe the nature of this particular
impairment as manifested in AHP and the nature of the presumed corresponding function in the undamaged brain. Borrow-
ing insights from Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962) I will call this aspect of body representation, the ‘impersonalised’ body.
Related concepts include the ‘habit’ body (Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962)), the off-line (vs. on-line) body representation
(Carruthers, 2008; see also Tsakiris & Fotopoulou, 2008) and of course the various versions of the old and highly problematic
distinction between body schema and body image. The proposed aspect of body representation is not proposed as ﬁtting any
of these terms exactly, nor being part of a simple contrast between the personal and the impersonal, or social body. As should
be obvious in light of what I have written above, no simple dichotomy of body representations would be sufﬁcient to account
for the multiple ways in which the body is represented in the mind and our existence is embodied in brain functioning. How-
ever, a proper discussion of all these concepts and terms escape the scope of this article. Instead, I use the term ‘impersona-
lised’ body in order to emphasise with a single, heuristic term the ‘objectiﬁed’ aspect of this domain of bodily perception, as
well as its personal and interpersonal origins.
Perceiving the world, including my own body, also entails the perception of the body’s action possibilities in the same
world. Indeed, my perception of the world is rarely conﬁned to the characteristics of the input that reaches my few, sensory
organs from my current, unique position and perspective in the world. Instead, my prior experiences of different sensations,
possibilities and positions in the world deﬁne how I perceive the world in any given time and space. For example, my mul-
tisensory expectations and reaching movements adjust to the characteristics and affordances of a glass on a table by the
mere sight of it from one particular egocentric perspective and prior to any current movements, or tactile feedback. Such
expectations constitute the world as real in relation to my body, even if they remain implicit most of the time. These ideas,
present in phenomenology, have been more recently explored in cognitive neuroscience and are accepted by scholars that
subscribe to the ideas of ‘multisensory integration’ and ‘enacted perception’. Moreover, such subpersonal processes are also
compatible with the reading of AHP in the light of the free energy framework; the perception of the world entails (uncon-
scious) inferences based on the agents prior embodied experiences with the same world. As Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962) ﬁrst
speculated, the affordances and multisensory characteristics of the world continue to appeal to the habitual body of the ano-
sognosic patient, in the same hidden way that they appealed to it prior to the paralysis. Moreover, as I have outlined, the
framework explicitly proposes that perception and action as operating in a continuum, being essentially governed by the
same operating principles.
There is however an aspect of such perceptual and active inference that seems to have received less attention within the
framework. The perception of the world, as a coherent canvas of multiple interrelated sensations, action possibilities and
perceptual perspectives, entails the implicit possibility that any given object can simultaneously be perceived by different
agents. When I look at the front of a chair, my awareness of the chair as one thing entails my tacit perception of its back.
In this sense, I may be aware that the chair can be perceived by different positions, by anyone, or by any-body (Taipale,
2014). In more explicit ways, my perception of the world is developmentally shaped by learning opportunities afforded
by solitary prior instances of active and perceptual inference, as well as by the active presence of other agents (see Krahe,
Springer, Weinman, & Fotopoulou, 2013 for related ideas in the domain of pain perception). A glass on a table is the object
that others and myself can manipulate at any given time, from any of our unique perspectives. This rich experience of others
interacting with the same world as ourselves is presumably at the basis of our everyday, intuitive sense of ‘veridical’ and
‘shared’ perception. We perceive the world as containing unique, whole-in-themselves objects despite the fact that our
actual perception of them from a subjective point of view will always be limited to the constraints of our body in time
and space, e.g. the position of our eyes on the head. This human, adult ability to simultaneously perceive the world, from
many silent, potential perspectives and the action possibilities they entail, seems to suggest not only that our perception
relies on inference but also that such inferences about the world is deeply embedded in the social world. Indeed, other than
classic phenomenological views on intersubjectivity (see Gallagher, 2008; Taipale, 2014; Zahavi, 2001 for recent consider-
ations), such ideas have been mostly developed in certain stands of developmental psychology (e.g. Reddy, 2008; Rochat,
2009).
This perspective however entails a kind of tension when applied to the body. Signals in the above mentioned domains of
the perceived body, including the exteroceptive and interoceptive domains, are ultimately integrated in egocentric coordi-
nates. The 1st-person perspective (spatial and mental) remains fundamental for the perception of the body as mine, as under
my volitional control and as separate from other objects in the world (e.g. Damasio, 1994). In other terms, although the body
can be perceived (objectiﬁed) as a kind of socially perceived, impersonal, unique object, it is also always the subject of all
experiences. As aforementioned, this tension has received many names in the history of mind and brain ﬁelds, and this paper
cannot even begin to address the complexities behind such questions. However, attempting to understand this tension in the
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everyday conscious perception of the body does not include two, separated experiences of the body.
We mostly conceive of the body we see in the mirror as the one who feels itself to be standing in front of the mirror. It
turns out that some patients with AHP do not share this experience. When looking at their paralysed body parts directly,
they believe they are able body parts, and if they are somatoparaphrenic, they may believe they belong to someone else.
However, when confronted with mirror images or video replays of their own body in the third-person perspective, the same
patients describe the reﬂected body parts as being paralysed and as belonging to themselves, respectively (Fotopoulou et al.,
2009, 2011; Jenkinson et al., 2013; Besharati, Kopelman, et al., 2014). These ﬁndings conﬁrm the distinction between ﬁrst
and third-person perspectives on body perception and they further highlight the primacy of the ﬁrst person perspective
in conscious perception: it is the (delusional) content of the ﬁrst person perspective that dominates their conscious aware-
ness when mirrors are not made available to them. We can thus conﬁrm Merleau-Ponty’s (1945/1962, p. 82) intuitions:
In the case under consideration, the ambiguity of knowledge amounts to this: our body comprise as it were two layers:
that of the habit body and that of the body in this moment. In the ﬁrst appear manipulatory objects that have disappeared
from the other and the problem how I can have the sensation of still possessing a limb I no longer have amounts to ﬁnding
out how the habitual body can act as guarantee for the body at this moment. How can I perceive objects as manipulatable
when I can no longer manipulate them? The manipulatable must have ceased to be what I am now manipulating, and
become what one can manipulate; it must have ceased to be a thing manipulatable for me and become a thing manipulate
in itself. Correspondingly, my body must be apprehended not only in an experience which is instantaneous, peculiar to itself
and complete in itself, but also in some general aspect and in the light of an impersonal being.
These observations also reveal another intriguing aspect of this distinction. Although these patients seem able to perceive
their body ‘correctly’ from a third-person perspective, they do not seem surprised by the difference between the content of the
twoperceptual instances. Even though theymaynot have ‘seen’ their ownarm for amonthor so, theydonot scream, ‘oh there it
my arm’ when we place a mirror in front of them. Nor do they blame us for suddenly giving them paralysis when we take the
mirror away. And they are not even surprised by the fact that they themselves have given a different answer about the own-
ership and agency of the same body part, just seconds ago. It thus seems that apart from their deﬁcits in updating their body
representation in the ﬁrst-person, they have also lost the ability to perceive their body as an object in the world that needs
to have a unique, socially-shared existence. The fact that they can recognize third-person, images of the body as theirs does
not seem sufﬁcient for the proper ‘objectiﬁcation’ of the body (i.e. the perception of the body as a thing in itself). The latter,
‘impersonalised’ sense of thebody therefore seems to involve cognitive andperhaps emotional operations that extend themere
self-recognition in third-person perspectives and rather bizarrely seem to also depend on a kind of grounding in the subjective
body, or at least a kind of ﬂexible, abstract perception and integration of 1st and 3rd person perspectives on the body.
The cognitive and emotional integration between ﬁrst and third person perspectives on the bodily self is thought to take
place progressively in development but developmental psychologists, as well as phenomenological and psychoanalytic
thinkers, seem to stress different aspects in these processes of self-objectiﬁcation and awareness. In fact, the majority of
studies and theories focus on how we come to understand or, infer other minds via their bodies, or how we come to regulate
our own emotions. Far less attention is paid to the mentalisation (see deﬁnition above) of one’s own body via the inﬂuence of
other people. While this discussion extends the scope of the current paper, I note certain possibilities as regards AHP here.
The loss of the ‘impersonalised body’ in AHP can be explained in at least two ways: (a) body awareness from a ﬁrst person
perspective, including the processing of both interoceptive and exteroceptive signals is higher in the neurocognitive hierar-
chy (Friston, 2013), thus prediction errors relating to the ‘objectiﬁed’ body are simply explained away by predictions about
the subjectively felt body and its related salience (see also section on the ‘Internal Body’); (b) the very faculty that allows
individuals to engage in the act of ﬂexible perspective-taking and integrate ﬁrst and third person perspectives is impaired.
The latter interpretation would be consistent with the observed damage in AHP patients in brain areas such as the tempo-
roparietal junctions and the superior temporal sulcus (e.g. Besharati, Forkel, et al., 2014; Fotopoulou et al., 2010; Moro et al.,
2011) and we have preliminary data showing that such lesions in patients with AHP are selectively associated with deﬁcits in
perspective taking and theory of mind abilities (Besharati et al., in preparation).
5. Conclusion
In this paper, I described the counterintuitive syndrome of anosognosia for hemiplegia, the striking, apparent unaware-
ness of paralysis following right hemisphere stroke. I further put forward a large-scale framework from computational neu-
roscience, namely the free energy framework in order to account for the clinical variability of AHP and unite previous,
seemingly divergent hypotheses about its pathogenesis. The framework proposes a view of human perception that relies
on inferring the self and the world in both perception and action on the basis of prior expectations and ambiguous sensory
signals. Contrary to intuition, our perception of the world is rarely conﬁned to the characteristics of the input that reaches
our sensory organs from our current, unique position and perspective in the world. Instead, our prior experiences of different
possibilities and positions in the world deﬁne how we perceive the world in any given moment and position in space. In this
sense, cognition can be thought of as imperfect, yet highly efﬁcient (in a Bayes-optimal sense) strategy for self-organization
in an ambiguous world. Anosognosia for hemiplegia, as a prototypical disorder of body unawareness, represents an exagger-
ation of such ‘imperfect’ body awareness system. I hope that the description of this neuropathology in the light of the free
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data to update its virtual model of the world, lack or imprecision of sensory prediction errors may lead to aberrant inferences
inﬂuenced disproportionally by outdated, premorbid predictions. Finally, I hope that this consideration of anosognosia stres-
ses that our learned, virtual model of the body is depended on the nature and thus integrity of the very body that allowed the
model to be formed in the ﬁrst instance.
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